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Historically, the conscious and anticipatory processes involved in voluntary action have
been associated with the loftiest heights of nervous function. Concepts like mental time
travel, “theory of mind,” and the formation of “the self” have been at the center of
many attempts to determine the purpose of consciousness. Eventually, more reduction-
istic accounts of consciousness emerged, proposing rather that conscious states play a
much more basic role in nervous function. Though the widely held integration consensus
proposes that conscious states integrate information-processing structures and events
that would otherwise be independent, Supramodular Interaction Theory (SIT) argues that
conscious states are necessary for the integration of only certain kinds of information. As
revealed in this selective review, this integration is related to what is casually referred to
as “voluntary” action, which is intimately related to the skeletal muscle output system.
Through a peculiar form of broadcasting, conscious integration often controls and guides
action via “ideomotor” mechanisms, where anticipatory processes play a central role.
Our selective review covers evidence (including findings from anesthesia research) for the
integration consensus, SIT, and ideomotor theory.
Keywords: consciousness, skeletal muscle, anticipation, ideomotor action, voluntary action
Understanding how consciousness arises from the brain is a far
greater task than what the average person might surmise. The
unfortunate truth is that, at the present stage of understanding,
not only do scientists not have a clue regarding how conscious
states emerge from the human nervous system, but they do not
even possess the smallest inkling regarding how something like
consciousness could emerge from any set of real or hypothetical
circumstances (Levine, 1983; Banks, 1995; Godwin et al., in press).
As Shallice (1972, p. 383) concludes, “The problem of conscious-
ness occupies an analogous position for cognitive psychology as
the problem of language behavior does for behaviorism, namely,
an unsolved anomaly within the domain of the approach.”
In this selective review, we discuss a subset of findings revealing
some humble progress regarding this puzzle. This progress stems
primarily from observations of everyday action planning,anticipa-
tory processing, and the voluntary control of overt action through
the skeletal muscle system. Examination of these interconnections
reveals why, for every voluntary action, the actor can self-report
conscious content responsible for that action. As explained below,
the implications of this often overlooked but reliable observa-
tion (that voluntary actions are connected to conscious content)
are important, even if self-reports on the causes of these actions
by actors are often inaccurate (Nisbett and Wilson, 1977; Weg-
ner, 2002, 2003). By integrating various disparate literatures, we
put a non-traditional frame on the connections among anticipa-
tion, conscious states, and skeletal muscle action (“skeletomotor
action,” for short). For instance, instead of studying conscious-
ness by focusing on perception (the dominant approach; Crick
and Koch, 2003), we examine consciousness by working backward
from overt action to trace the central processes responsible for
action (Morsella and Bargh, 2010). We also find relevant clues
about the nature of consciousness from research on anesthesia.
Prior to discussing the interconnections among conscious
states, anticipation, and skeletomotor action, it is important to
explain what we mean by the generally ethereal concept of con-
sciousness.“Consciousness,”which is also sometimes referred to as
“sentience” (Pinker, 1997), a “phenomenal state” (Jackson, 1982;
Tye, 1999), “qualia” (Gray, 2004), or “subjective experience,” has
been perhaps best defined by the philosopher Nagel (1974), who
proposed that an organism possesses subjective experiences if there
is something it is like to be that organism – something it is like, for
example, to be human and experience warmth, love, yellowness, or
breathlessness. Similarly, Block (1995, p. 227) says,“the phenome-
nally conscious aspect of a state is what it is like to be in that state.”
In this article, we are interested in this most basic form of con-
sciousness, a form of consciousness that should be distinguished
from higher forms of consciousness (e.g., self-consciousness, con-
sciousness of one’s culture, etc.). From our perspective, if any
thing has an experience of any kind, then it possesses the kind
of consciousness in which we are interested.
While it is true that throughout the history of psychology,
“consciousness” has been coupled with outstandingly complex
phenomena like “the self” and mental time travel (see review of
high-level theories in Morsella, 2005), recently, less lofty accounts
of consciousness have emerged, proposing rather that conscious
states play a much more basic role in nervous function. One
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promising direction of this research has been achieved by jux-
taposing conscious and unconscious processes in terms of their
cognitive and neural correlates (e.g., Shallice, 1972; Baars, 1988,
2002; Logothetis and Schall, 1989; Crick and Koch, 1995; Kins-
bourne, 1996; Wegner and Bargh, 1998; Grossberg, 1999; Di Lollo
et al., 2000; Dehaene and Naccache, 2001; Gray, 2004; Libet, 2004;
Laureys, 2005; Morsella, 2005; Merker, 2007; Doesburg et al., 2009;
Damasio, 2010; Boly et al., 2011). This contrastive approach has
revealed that many sophisticated processes can, and do, occur
unconsciously (cf., Godwin et al., in press). For example, motor
programming – which calculates the muscle fibers that should be
activated at a given time in order to enact action – falls into the
category of processes that can occur unconsciously (James, 1890;
Grossberg, 1999; Fecteau et al., 2001; Rossetti, 2001; Rosenbaum,
2002; Goodale and Milner, 2004; Johnson and Haggard, 2005;
Heath et al., 2008). Additionally, low-level (or “pre-conscious”)
perceptual processing also occurs unconsciously (Crick and Koch,
1995; Gray, 2004; Koch, 2004). Other mechanisms linking per-
ception to action can also transpire unconsciously, as with the
relatively obvious case of reflexes or in the less common case of
automatisms (see review in Morsella and Bargh, 2011). It is impor-
tant to note, that subliminal stimuli have been shown to reliably
elicit motor acts as well (Fehrer and Biederman, 1962; Fehrer and
Raab, 1962; Taylor and McCloskey, 1990, 1996; Hallett, 2007).
This contrastive approach has revealed that so much of ner-
vous function is both unconscious and sophisticated. It has lead
many researchers to what would have once been an unanticipated
question: What do conscious states, in fact, add to brain function?
At present, it seems the answer lies in what has come to be called
the integration consensus (Tononi and Edelman, 1988; Dama-
sio, 1989; Freeman, 1991; Baars, 1998; Zeki and Bartels, 1999;
Dehaene and Naccache, 2001; Llinás and Ribary, 2001; Varela
et al., 2001; Clark, 2002; Ortinski and Meador, 2004; Sergent and
Dehaene, 2004; Del Cul et al., 2007; Doesburg et al., 2009; Ulhaas
et al., 2009; Boly et al., 2011). The integration consensus proposes
that conscious states integrate neural activities and information-
processing structures that would otherwise be independent (see
a review in Baars, 2005). For example, when actions are decou-
pled from consciousness (e.g., in neurological disorders such as
anarchic hand syndrome and utilization behavior syndrome; Lher-
mitte, 1983; Marchetti and Della Sala, 1998), the actions (e.g., a
hand meandering through irrelevant actions like tugging at its
owner’s shirt) often appear impulsive or inappropriate, as if they
are not influenced by the kinds of information by which they
should be influenced (Morsella and Bargh, 2011). Most theoret-
ical frameworks in the integration consensus speak of conscious
information as being available “globally” in some kind of mental
workspace (Baars, 2002; Sergent and Dehaene, 2004).
Separate from this global-reach system of conscious integra-
tion, unconscious processes involve smaller networks of brain
areas and require less widespread activation than their conscious
counterparts (Sergent and Dehaene, 2004; Baars, 2005; Gaillard
et al., 2009). (See review in Morsella et al., 2010.) For exam-
ple, the unconsciously mediated action of reflexive swallowing
involves substantially fewer brain regions than volitional swallow-
ing (Kern et al., 2001; Ortinski and Meador, 2004). Additionally, in
the unconscious phases of deep sleep, auditory input yields activity
that is limited to only the primary auditory cortex (Portas et al.,
2000).
It seems that, for consciousness, the mode of interaction among
regions is as important as the nature and loci of the regions
(Buzsáki, 2006). For instance, the presence or lack of what has
been called “interregional synchrony” leads to different cognitive
and behavioral outcomes (Hummel and Gerloff, 2005; see review
of neuronal communication through “coherence” in Fries, 2005).
In binocular rivalry, for example, it is evident that the mode of
interaction between areas is important for conscious states. Dur-
ing this phenomenon (Logothetis and Schall, 1989), an observer is
presented with different visual stimuli to each eye simultaneously
(e.g., an image of a house in one eye and of a face in the other). It
might seem reasonable that, faced with such stimuli, an observer
would perceive an image combining both objects – a house over-
lapping a face. Surprisingly, even though both images are always
present, an observer experiences seeing only one object at time (i.e.,
a house and then a face). At any moment, the observer is unaware
of the computational processes leading to this outcome; the con-
flict and mechanism of resolution are unconscious. Neurally, while
experiencing binocular rivalry, it is only the conscious percept that
is coupled, in terms of interregional synchrony, to both perceptual
brain activity and motor-related processes in frontal cortex, thus
supporting the view that the mode of interaction between areas,
and not just activation of the areas, is important for consciousness
(Doesburg et al., 2009).
EVIDENCE FROM RESEARCH ON ANESTHESIA
Supporting the integration consensus, findings in the field of anes-
thesiology suggest that anesthetic agents work on consciousness in
part by halting the integration of information across widespread
brain networks (Mashour, 2004; Hudetz, 2006; Alkire et al., 2008;
Lee et al., 2009). Anesthetics may inhibit integration by acting on
structures that are necessary for widespread cortical broadcasting
and by slowing neural responses, thereby affecting synchroniza-
tion (Munglani et al., 1993; Alkire et al., 2008). Indeed, Flohr’s
(1995) information-processing theory, John and Prichep’s (2005)
anesthetic cascade, Mashour’s (2004) cognitive unbinding paradigm,
and Alkire et al.’s (2000) unified theory of narcosis all directly or
indirectly support the idea that anesthetics are acting by disrupting
integration in the brain (Mashour, 2006).
Regarding thalamic accounts of consciousness (e.g., Penfield
and Jasper, 1954; Merker, 2007), the most consistently reported
effect of anesthetic agents is the reduction in thalamic blood flow
and metabolism during the loss of consciousness (Hudetz, 2006;
Alkire et al., 2008; Långsjö et al., 2012). It has also been sug-
gested that thalamic blocking of somatosensory information may
be the cause of the anesthetic state (Angel, 1991; Hudetz, 2006).
Some anesthetics may work by affecting the posterior lateral cor-
ticothalamic complex and perhaps a medial cortical core, either
directly or indirectly, thus resulting in unconsciousness (Alkire
et al., 2008). Additionally, thalamocortical connectivity is associ-
ated with recovery from vegetative states (Laureys et al., 2000a,b;
Mashour, 2006). However, not all anesthetics act on the thalamus
in the same manner. The anesthetic ketamine, for example, results
in increases in thalamic metabolism while sevoflurane sedation
decreases such metabolism while the subject remains conscious
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(cf., Alkire et al., 2008). Additionally, studies using electroen-
cephalography (EEG) have shown that, as soon as a subject loses
consciousness, there is a marked change in cortical EEG,while thal-
amic EEG remains relatively the same for some minutes afterward.
This begs the question as to whether the thalamus is inacti-
vated directly or perhaps indirectly following cortical suppression
(Alkire et al., 2008).
Some research on anesthesia suggests that frontal cortex alone
may not constitute consciousness (Penfield and Jasper, 1954;
Merker, 2007; Alkire et al., 2008). For instance, recent investi-
gations into feedforward and feedbackward connectivity while
under anesthesia suggest that conscious states are associated with,
not only frontal activations, but specific frontoparietal networks
(Ku et al., 2011). Additionally, low doses of anesthetics have been
shown to slow the feedback stream of cortical processing, while
increasing doses slow both the feedforward and feedback streams
of cortical processing. These findings suggest that some form of
widespread feedback dynamics, or“reentrant”processing (Di Lollo
et al., 2000; Fahrenfort et al., 2007), may play an integral part
in conscious awareness (see below; Hudetz, 2006; Långsjö et al.,
2012). In addition, the notion that frontal cortex is unnecessary
for consciousness is consistent with investigations on prefrontal
lobe syndromes (Gray, 2004), the phenomenology of action and
behavior (Desmurget et al., 2009; Desmurget and Sirigu, 2010),
and the psychophysiology of consciousness in dreams, which
involves prefrontal deactivations (Muzur et al., 2002). (See evi-
dence for a necessary role of frontal cortex in consciousness in
Boly et al., 2011). There are other regions that may be unnec-
essary for the brain to constitute a basic form of consciousness.
For example, although the absence of the spinal cord or cere-
bellum leads to sensory, motor, cognitive, and affective deficits,
the non-participation of these regions does not seem to eliminate
basic consciousness (Schmahmann, 1998; Morsella et al., 2010).
Similarly, non-participation of the basal ganglia, hippocampus,
mammillary bodies, right cerebral cortex, or mediodorsal nucleus
of the thalamus does not seem to hinder the ability of the nervous
system to generate a basic form of consciousness (see evidence in
Morsella et al., 2010; Godwin et al., in press).
SUPRAMODULAR INTERACTION THEORY AND LIMITATIONS OF THE
INTEGRATION CONSENSUS
One limitation of the integration consensus is that it fails to spec-
ify exactly which kinds of integration require conscious states and
which kinds can occur unconsciously. For example, conscious pro-
cessing is unnecessary for integrations across different sensory
modalities (e.g., the binding of features in perceptual objects)
or integrations involving smooth muscle effectors (e.g., integra-
tions in the pupillary reflex; Morsella et al., 2009a). In both cases,
these integrations/conflicts can transpire unconsciously. In con-
trast, people tend to be aware of some of the conflicts in their
nervous system. When a swimmer holds her breath underwater, for
example, she cannot help but be aware of the conflict of restraining
an automatic process like breathing. Further, approach–approach
conflicts also beg for awareness (Lewin, 1935; Miller, 1959). These
types of conflicts, conscious conflicts (Morsella, 2005), involve com-
petition for control of the skeletal muscle output system and are
triggered by incompatible skeletomotor plans, as when one holds
one’s breath while underwater, suppresses uttering something, or
inhibits a prepotent response in a laboratory response interference
paradigm (e.g., the Stroop and Flanker tasks; Stroop, 1935; Erik-
sen and Eriksen, 1974). Supramodular Interaction Theory (SIT;
Morsella, 2005) proposes that, while the primary function of con-
scious states is to integrate information, only certain kinds of
information require conscious integration. Specifically, it is high-
level information in the service of curbing skeletomotor action so
that such action is adaptive, as in the case of holding one’s breath
or breathing at a faster rate for some reward. Conscious conflicts
are a dramatic case of such interactions. (The theory is called
“supramodular,” because the integrations occur at a high-level,
beyond that of the Fodorian module, which is used for, say, color,
and motion detection; the term “interaction” is used in the theory
because conscious states permit interactions between high-level
systems vying for skeletomotor control; see treatments of modu-
larity in Fodor, 1983; Callebaut and Rasskin-Gutman, 2009.) The
actual integration amongst such response systems may actually be
“post-conscious” (Morsella, 2005). (For a thorough review of the
nature of the difference between the access of information during
conscious states and the subjectivity associated with that informa-
tion, see Atkinson et al., 2000.) From our standpoint, conscious
states are necessary, not to integrate perceptual-level processes
(like feature binding), but to permit interactions among action
goal inclinations that, eventually, influence the skeletal muscle sys-
tem; this idea is captured in the principle of Parallel Responses into
Skeletal Muscle (PRISM; Morsella, 2005).
To summarize in different and more concrete terms, SIT pro-
poses that, in the nervous system, there are three distinct kinds
of integration or “binding” (Morsella and Bargh, 2011). Percep-
tual binding (or afference binding ) is the binding of perceptual
processes and representations. This occurs in feature binding (e.g.,
the binding of shape to color; Zeki and Bartels, 1999) and inter-
sensory binding (McGurk and MacDonald, 1976; Vroomen and
de Gelder, 2003), in which disparate senses integrate informa-
tion across the perceptual field (e.g., visual and auditory inputs
regarding the source of a sound interact unconsciously). (See addi-
tional evidence for unconscious afference binding in Zmigrod and
Hommel, 2011).
The second form of binding (efference binding ) links percep-
tual processing to action/motor production (Haggard et al., 2002).
(For advanced treatments of the topic of integration across percep-
tion and action, see Hommel et al., 2001; Astor-Jack and Haggard,
2005; Magen and Cohen, 2010.) This kind of stimulus-response
(S→R) binding allows for automatic button presses in response
to a cue. Research has shown that efference binding can happen
unconsciously, as when subjects are able to select the correct motor
response (one of two button presses) when confronted with a
subliminal cue (Fehrer and Biederman, 1962; Fehrer and Raab,
1962; Taylor and McCloskey, 1990, 1996; Hallett, 2007). (For stud-
ies revealing how instructions held in mind can lead to S→R
mappings that resemble that of reflexes, see Cohen-Kdoshay and
Meiran, 2009; Hommel, 2000; Wenke et al., 2007). More com-
monly, this kind of binding can also be mediated unconsciously in
actions such as the pain withdrawal reflex and reflexive swallow-
ing and inhalation. The third form of binding, efference–efference
binding, occurs when two streams of efference binding are trying
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to influence skeletomotor action simultaneously (Morsella and
Bargh, 2011). Importantly, these streams of efference are “bound”
at, at least, the level of overt action. For instance, when a swim-
mer holds her breath, she experiences the conflict between the two
efferent streams (wanting to inhale/wanting to suppress inhala-
tion) and produces an action that is a “binding” of the two
inclinations. In this case, the integration at the level of overt behav-
ior is her holding her breath but behaving less comfortably than if
provided with oxygen. In such a way, conflicted behavior is overtly
different from non-conflicted behavior, as Skinner notes (Skinner,
1953). To him, such behaviors are more perturbable and slower in
their execution. In the context of laboratory research, conflicted
skeletomotor action is also apparent when a research participant
suppresses a prepotent response like word reading in a response
interference paradigm such as the classic Stroop task (where par-
ticipants are asked only to name the color in which a word is
presented). Importantly, conflicts involving perceptual processing
or smooth muscle do not yield such changes in consciousness
(Morsella et al., 2009a).
The tenets of SIT principally concern, not which kinds of inter-
actions do and do not occur with phenomenal mediation, but, in
identifying the function of consciousness, which kinds of basic
processes cannot occur without phenomenal mediation. Thus,
it is not within the scope of SIT to identify all the modular or
supramodular outputs that one can be conscious of. Rather, SIT
is about which integrative processes require conscious mediation.
During conflicts that require conscious mediation, one is aware
of the conflicting components (e.g., pain and hunger) that are
brought together to influence action. Interestingly, however, one
is unaware of the computational products of conscious interac-
tion, which, should they exist, are observable only in the form
of expressed behavior (e.g., breathing faster for some reward;
Morsella, 2005). In other words, one is unconscious of the rep-
resentations reflecting the resolution of the conflict (if such rep-
resentations exist). Consciousness is necessary for the integration,
but the integration is best represented, not in consciousness, but
in overt behavior. Hence, our theoretical approach is named “SIT”
and not “supramodular integration theory,” because, for the rea-
sons just outlined, the term integration is a loaded term. One must
consider that “to combine” does not necessarily imply “to resolve.”
It should be reiterated that this survey comprises a selective
review of research findings, a review based on one specific van-
tage point (for other accounts of information integration, see
Tononi and Edelman, 1988; Logan et al., 1999; Baars, 2002; Miller
and Ulrich, 2003; Goodale and Milner, 2004; Dijksterhuis and
Nordgren, 2006; Ulrich et al., 2007). From the present stand-
point, consciousness can be construed as a “crosstalk” medium
that allows conflicting efference streams to influence action col-
lectively, leading to integrated actions (Morsella and Bargh, 2011)
such as our swimmer holding her breath. Absent conscious-
ness, behavior can be influenced by only one of the efference
streams, leading to un-integrated actions (Morsella and Bargh,
2011) such as unconsciously inhaling while underwater, or, in
another common example, reflexively dropping a carelessly made
latte at Starbucks, because it feels too hot. As mentioned above, the
integration afforded by consciousness involves high-level informa-
tion that can be polysensory, and occurs at a stage of processing
“beyond” that of the traditional Fodorian module (Fodor, 1983).
The information that is represented consciously (or, in the “con-
scious field”; Morsella, 2005) can be considered the output of
systems that are usually consciously impenetrable: In this sense,
one may be able to suppress dropping the latte, but one cannot sup-
press the subjective urge to perform the act. From this standpoint,
conscious crosstalk permits important information (or outputs) to
be broadcasted to the systems responsible for skeletomotor action.
In summary, the difference between unconscious action (i.e.,
reflexes and the like) and conscious action is that the former is
always a case of un-integrated action, and the latter can be a case
of “integrated action.” Our central claim here is that integrated
action occurs when two (or more) action plans – that might
normally influence behavior on their own – simultaneously co-
activate and try to influence the same skeletal muscle effector at
the same moment in time (Morsella and Bargh, 2011). It follows
then that integrated action in every day life occurs when one: holds
one’s breath, refrains from dropping a hot latte, does not scratch
an itch, or breathes faster than normal on purpose (e.g., for some
reward). In ours and others’ academic studies, integrated actions
occur when participants are asked to do things like suppress a pre-
potent response in a laboratory paradigm such as the Stroop Task.
(See Morsella et al., 2011, for a quantitative review of laboratory
evidence supporting SIT.)
THE SKELETAL MUSCLE EFFECTOR SYSTEM
The skeletal muscle effector system differs substantively from most
effector systems in the body (e.g., smooth muscle) in that distinct
brain regions and brain systems try to control it in different – and
often opposing – ways. From this standpoint, skeletal muscle is
like a single steering wheel controlled simultaneously by multiple
agentic systems. Each of these agentic systems has its own par-
ticular operating principles, phylogenetic origins, and concerns.
While motor programs are instantiated by unconscious algorithms
(Rosenbaum, 2002), the selection of higher level action goals hap-
pens because conscious states are able to crosstalk, which in turn
leads to constraint and curbing of skeletomotor output. For exam-
ple, one system in a chef ’s body “protests” when she accidentally
touches a hot pot in her kitchen, but another system reinforces
another act just as accidental when she mindlessly brings sugar to
her lips in a moment of thought. As in the case of our chef, people
are conscious of the tendencies (e.g., the urges and cravings) of
these systems, but not necessarily of the factors engendering the
tendencies themselves (tissue damage versus the relative rarity of
sugar in nature; Nisbett and Wilson, 1977; Baker et al., 2004).
It has been known since at least the nineteenth century that
skeletal muscle (or “striated muscle”) is the only bodily effec-
tor system that can be (though often it is not) controlled con-
sciously. However, why this is so has never been addressed theo-
retically. SIT is – in essence – a systematic reinterpretation of this
age-old fact: Skeletomotor actions are at times “consciously medi-
ated” because these actions are directed by multiple, encapsulated
systems that require conscious states to crosstalk and yield adap-
tive action, especially when the systems are in conflict (Morsella,
2005). Although identifying still higher level systems is beyond
the present purview of SIT, PRISM has correctly predicted that
certain aspects of emotional behaviors, reproductive behaviors,
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parental care, and addiction-related behaviors should be coupled
with conscious states, because they all exert influence over skeletal
muscle plans.
It should be emphasized that there is nothing intrinsically spe-
cial about skeletal muscle that causes it to be related to conscious
states. Conscious processing distinguishes itself from unconscious
processing not simply because it involves skeletal muscle, but
because of the particular way conscious processing involves skele-
tal muscle: encapsulated systems in the brain vie to implement
their own concerns over the organism in the arena of skeleto-
motor action planning. Yet, it is important to keep in mind that
skeletal muscle is often controlled without conscious mediation,
like when a person reading an academic paper shifts his posture,
blinks, breathes, or yawns.
MARRYING CONSCIOUSNESS TO THE ANTICIPATORY, PHYSIOLOGICAL
SYSTEM IT SUBSERVES
A primary strength of this approach is that, instead of trying to
reverse engineer the purpose of consciousness by examining all
that consciousness is capable of doing, it integrates consciousness
with most basic of physiological processes it evolved to subserve.
From this view, consciousness is one of many processes in the
service of adaptive skeletomotor control, which is not surpris-
ing given that the primary function of the entire nervous sys-
tem is to activate the right muscles at the right time. Richard
Dawkins notes this succinctly, “The main way in which brains
actually contribute to the success of survival machines is by con-
trolling and coordinating the contraction of muscles” (Dawkins,
1976, p. 49). And Roe and Simpson (1958) propose that, in
evolutionary history, overt action is the critical product of a ner-
vous system, because natural selection can operate only on overt
action.
Our approach outlines how consciousness is a phenomenon
falling squarely within the somatic nervous system (Figure 1); it is
within the somatic system that instrumental actions (e.g., holding
a hot cup of coffee) are achieved through the mysterious phenome-
non of direct cognitive control (Morsella et al., 2009c). Interestingly,
direct cognitive control is probably best exemplified by one’s ability
to immediately control the direction of thought or the movements
of a finger or arm (or any other skeletal muscle effectors). Further,
when direct control is unavailable, indirect forms of control can
be implemented. For example, while it is clear that one may not
be able to directly influence one’s affective/incentive states at will
(Öhman and Mineka, 2001), a nurse can watch her favorite com-
edy to cheer herself up after a trying day watching people suffer.
In other words, regarding direct cognitive control, no one can
make oneself intentionally become frightened, happy, angry, sad,
or become hungry if the adequate conditions are absent. Yet, peo-
ple use indirect cognitive control to seek and even pay for certain
experiences (e.g., going to movies or comedy clubs) to put them-
selves in a desired state that cannot be instantiated through an act
of will.
While instrumental use of the skeletomotor system involves
direct cognitive control, an additional component is often
required: a mental representation of the instrumental conse-
quences of action. For instance, we must have the idea of what
a cup of coffee looks or feels like in our hands in order to perform
this type of instrumental action. Because of this, the skeletomotor
system is – by nature – highly anticipatory (Frith et al., 2000;
Berthoz, 2002; Llinás, 2002). The operating principles of the
directed actions of this system are perhaps best understood in
terms of the historical notion of ideomotor processing (Greenwald,
1970; Hommel et al., 2001; Hommel, 2009; Hommel and Elsner,
2009). Ideomotor theory holds that the mental image of an instru-
mental action tends to lead to the execution of that action (Lotze,
1852; Harleß, 1861; James, 1890), with the motor programming
involved being unconscious (James,1890). Simply imagining mov-
ing your right arm to reach out for that coffee cup makes the action
more likely to occur (for a treatment of why the motor programs
involved are unconscious, see Gray, 1995, 2004; Grossberg, 1999;
Prinz, 2003). Originating in the times of Lotze (1852), Harleß
(1861), and Carpenter (1874), the hypothesis states that action
guidance and action knowledge are limited to perceptual-like rep-
resentations (or, event codes; cf., Hommel et al., 2001) of action
outcomes (e.g., the “image” of one’s finger flexing; Gray, 1995,
2004; Rossetti, 2001; Rosenbaum, 2002; Jeannerod, 2006). (See
neuroimaging evidence for the ideomotor principle in Melcher
et al., 2008.) From this standpoint, conscious contents regarding
ongoing action are primarily of the perceptual consequences of
action (Jeannerod, 2006).
Ideomotor processing is evident in the following anecdote
(mentioned in Berger et al., 2012). The television program
60 Minutes presented a story about how, with today’s tech-
nological developments, patients can control robotic arm/limb
prostheses. In the episode, the 60 Minutes interviewer was sur-
prised to learn that a soldier who had tragically lost his lower
arm in combat could, in just a few trials, control the grasping
motions of a robotic hand. The robot hand was connected to an
array of electrodes attached to the muscles of the intact part of
the soldier’s upper arm. The interviewer asked the soldier how,
when operating the prostheses for only a few trials, it was possi-
ble to know which muscles to activate in order to have the robot
enact a particular action. The soldier replied to the effect that he
had no idea regarding which muscles to activate, nor what the
muscles were actually doing. Rather, the soldier claimed that, to
enact any action on the part of the robotic arm, all that had to be
done was imagine the grasping action. This image, what Harleß
in the nineteenth century called in German the Effektbild (in Eng-
lish, “the picture or image of the effect”), was somehow translated
(unconsciously) into the kind of muscular activation that would
normally result in a grasping action. (Additional evidence for
ideomotor theory stems from response-effect compatibility para-
digms; Kunde, 2001, in which anticipated action consequences
influence how quickly one executes a given action; cf., Hubbard
et al., 2011.)
These images (or mental representations) tend to mirror the
real-world perceptual aspects of their outcomes (i.e., the men-
tal representation of holding a coffee cup involves haptic and
visual information, etc., Hommel, 2009). This is obvious in the
case of subvocalizing (i.e., talking in one’s head). The imagery
of the act is isomorphic in some sense to the act (Morsella
and Bargh, 2010). Once an action outcome (e.g., grasping a
cup) is selected, unconscious motor efference streams enact
the action by activating the right muscles at the right time.
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FIGURE 1 |The major divisions of the nervous system and the
circumscribed province of conscious processing within the system.
The major divisions include the Somatic and Autonomic systems. Within
the former, Fodorian modules operate within a few multimodal,
supramodular response systems (the cortical instrumental system and
subcortical action systems), each defined by its concern (e.g., tissue
damage and elimination). The instrumental system can control fine motor
acts through ideomotor processing. Afference binding within systems can
be unconscious. Although response systems can influence action directly,
as in the case of un-integrated actions, only in virtue of conscious states
can multiple response systems interact and influence action collectively,
as when one holds one’s breath.
There are, of course, also times when mental representations
inhibit or cannot lead to the performance of instrumental goals.
For example, though the system can represent leaping over a
tall building in a single bound, limitations of the body pre-
vent the action from occurring. Conversely, a woman holding
an overheated latte can be prevented from sipping it because
the “incentive systems” that are concerned with bodily needs
curb her against inflicting tissue damage through one’s skele-
tomotor actions (Morsella, 2005; Morsella et al., 2009b). Inter-
estingly, because of the anticipatory nature of ideomotor pro-
cessing, the same stimulus (a cup) can elicit different action
tendencies, with each tendency serving the same overarching
goal (grasping a cup and bringing it to the mouth; see Lash-
ley, 1942). In motor control, this is known as “motor equiv-
alence” (Lashley, 1942). (For Lashley’s conceptualization of the
role of consciousness in behavior, see Lashley, 1923.) Thus, while
adaptive skeletomotor action requires integration and anticipa-
tion, it also – in some cases – requires a more elaborate form
of anticipation: mental simulation/representation (Schacter and
Addis, 2007).
THE ECHO HYPOTHESIS AND NATURE OF CONSCIOUS BROADCASTING
Regarding the nuts and bolts of conscious broadcasting, one
intriguing hypothesis stemming from observations of phenom-
ena involving backward masking (Breitmeyer and Ögmen, 2006)
and other forms of masking (e.g., object-substitution masking; Di
Lollo et al., 2000) is that, for a representation to be a conscious
representation, the initial modules that constructed the repre-
sentation must then, in turn, receive feedback activation about
that representation. An interesting aspect of consciousness is that
these representations are broadcasted and available globally (Baars,
2002). Perhaps, if visual modules X and Y construct a represen-
tation for broadcast, that representation becomes conscious only
after feedback activation from the broadcast returns to these two
modules, much like an echo (Di Lollo et al., 2000; Fahrenfort
et al., 2007). This may be because (a) this echoic (or, “reentrant”;
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Fahrenfort et al., 2007) processing is a necessary ingredient for the
generation of consciousness (Di Lollo et al., 2000), or (b) sim-
ply because consciousness requires involvement of frontal cortex,
which, after receiving the broadcast, must send top-down activa-
tion back to the modules for the representation to be conscious
(Boly et al., 2011). It may also be for other, less interesting reasons,
such as (c) conscious representations require a substantial amount
of activation (Kinsbourne, 1996), and reentrant feedback results
in this necessary increase in activation, or that (d), for a represen-
tation to be conscious, it must be activated for a long time (Lau,
2009), something that can be achieved through feedback and sus-
tained reverberation (Hebb, 1949). Regardless of the mechanism
by which feedback may be necessary for turning an unconscious
representation into a conscious one, the echo hypothesis is a falsifi-
able proposal that can further illuminate the component processes
giving rise to conscious states.
Because of the broadcasting in the conscious field, a represen-
tation is then available to more systems than just the one that
produced it. Critical for a successful broadcast of any kind of
information (in any system) is that there be “receivers” capable
of detecting and processing the information. The nature of such
receivers remains mysterious, but one can surmise that, regard-
ing the representations at play and with respect to such receivers,
these representations must possess properties that make them
communicable across a wide range of brain systems, including
those concerned with action control. Indeed, there is indepen-
dent evidence for the notion that the representations involved in
consciousness happen to be highly broadcastable (Fodor, 1983;
see treatment in Godwin et al., in press). In a cyclical manner,
after each broadcast, each concerned system evaluates the out-
puts in the field and then generates its own output, which then
influences the content of the field (Baumeister and Masicampo,
2010; Morsella and Bargh, 2010). In this way, the field changes
in a self-evolving manner. This is perhaps best illustrated by way
of example. Imagine a student in a lecture who suddenly gets an
incessant tickle in his throat and wants to cough (i.e., an “action
goal” of coughing enters the conscious field). This want, how-
ever, also leads to another action goal – to not make noise in
the class during the lecture. In turn, this most recent goal could
lead to the willful activation of a memory of a hysterical moment
from a movie to distract him from coughing, but ironically this
can also lead to the action goal of suppressing a chuckle. In this
way, the contents of the conscious field change over time in a
multi-determined manner, with conscious contents entering it and
exiting it while influencing subsequent contents, all while uncon-
scious systems evaluate contents and contribute their own contents
(Morsella and Bargh, 2010), all in the service of constraining
skeletomotor action. Thus, the Jamesian stream of consciousness
involves not only one conscious thought – broadcast to a plethora
of receivers and leading to another conscious thought – but (a)
conscious thoughts triggering unconscious processes which lead
to the introduction of other conscious thoughts into the field,
and (b) unconscious processes spawning their own conscious
outputs, independent of field contents. Hence, the function of
conscious states is not to observe outputs, but to allow contin-
uous interactions among outputs and the systems that gave rise
to them. Hence, perhaps it is better to compare the phenomenal
field, not to a surveillance system, but to a senate (Morsella,
2005).
What we refer to as “voluntary action” occurs with all of these
processes at play. The voluntary action is believed by the actor to
be a function of these conscious representations (which remains
possible), but it may well be that the act and the conscious repre-
sentations are both determined by some other, unconscious factor
(Wegner, 2002). Regardless, as mentioned above, for every volun-
tary act, the actor can provide through self-report an identification
of a conscious content that he or she believes gave rise to the act,
regardless of whether these introspections are incorrect. In the case
of voluntary action, these contents tend to be anticipatory and
isomorphic with action outcomes (Morsella and Bargh, 2010).
With all this in mind, it could be said that the voluntary act is,
in a sense, a “loaded” action, with a heavy load of information-
processing, conscious representations, and anticipatory mecha-
nisms. This standpoint defines a voluntary action in ways more
informative than the common “homuncular” definition of volun-
tary action – that an action is voluntary if the organism intended
to do it. Our approach reveals that, unlike involuntary actions
(e.g., dropping an overheated latte because of the pain withdrawal
reflex), voluntary actions can be construed as a form of integrated
action, which occurs when multiple action plans are co-activated
and trying to influence the same skeletomotor effector. As noted
by Passingham (1995), voluntary actions are special in that they
can be suppressed; from present standpoint, the act of suppression
(like our student suppressing his cough) is an archetypal integrated
action.
SYNTHESIS
Building on the integration consensus, SIT proposes that con-
scious states integrate information-processing structures and ner-
vous events that would otherwise be independent. According to
SIT, the integration involved is primarily related to the skeletal
muscle output system – where anticipatory processes play a cen-
tral role – and, through a form of broadcasting, this integration
controls and guides voluntary action, often via ideomotor mecha-
nisms. Importantly, SIT is unique in its ability to explain subjective
data from (a) intersensory conflicts, (b) smooth muscle conflicts,
and (c) conflicts from skeletomotor conflicts (e.g., holding one’s
breath and Stroop-like interference). SIT also explains why skeletal
muscle is “voluntary” muscle.
Throughout the process of evolution, there has been a trend
toward increased compartmentalization of function in the ner-
vous system (Allman, 2000). In phylogeny, the introduction of
new structures such as organs and tissues involves complex, often
competitive interactions with previously existing ones. This prob-
lem, known as the “struggle of parts” problem (cf., Mayr, 2001),
may have been a particularly formidable challenge during the evo-
lution of something as complex as the human nervous system and
could have led to various forms of “integrative solutions,” includ-
ing unconscious reflexes (Sherrington, 1906; Campbell, 1993) and
neural convergence (Damasio, 1989).
A fundamental assumption of our approach is that, although
crosstalk between high-level action systems could conceivably
occur without something like conscious states, such a solution
was not selected in our evolutionary history. Instead, for reasons
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that only the happenstance process of evolution could explain
(Simpson, 1949; Gould, 1977), these specific physical adaptations
seem to have been selected to solve this large-scale, crosstalk prob-
lem (Morsella, 2005). Certainly, it is easy to imagine integrated
actions (e.g., suppressing a chuckle) occurring without anything
like conscious states, but, then again, there are many solutions to
phylogenic problems that the human body did not arrive at by
way of evolution. SIT aims to take an inductive and descriptive
approach at understanding nervous function “as is,” and not as it
(perhaps) should be. This makes SIT a descriptive rather than nor-
mative theory; and intuitions regarding how the nervous system
should work (to be“optimal”) take a back seat to actual data reveal-
ing the manner in which it actually works (even if it is suboptimal).
Hence, while some theorists have proposed that consciousness is
“epiphenomenal,” (i.e., serving no function), it seems premature
to arrive at such a conclusion until there is a sufficient scientific
understanding about the place of consciousness in nature.
CRITICISMS AND ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS FOR THE CURRENT
APPROACH
SIT contrasts the actions of the skeletal muscle effector system
with the actions of smooth muscle (e.g., the pupillary reflex), but
it is possible that this juxtaposition could be criticized a priori as
a false comparison because the behaviors of smooth muscle are
not seen as a veritable form of action. From the point of view of
such a critique, processes including the pupillary reflex, peristal-
sis, digestion, breathing, and other “vegetative” organismic actions
should not be compared to what is commonly regarded as a typical
form of action (e.g., blinking voluntarily). While we have to allow
that these smooth muscle actions do not feel like actions, any
denial of these phenomena under the category of action would
exclude them, not on the basis of how an agnostic observer might
see them, but because of the intuitions humans hold about the
sources of their actions. If we imagine an intelligent non-human
observer (e.g., an imaginary, extraterrestrial ethologist) studying
the every actions humans are capable of, events such as the pupil-
lary reflex would be worthy of being “coded” as an action just
as certainly as a voluntary closing of the eyes (e.g., a wink) or
an involuntary closing of the eyes (e.g., a reflexive blink; Skinner,
1953).
A second – intuitively intriguing – criticism could be that there
are many aspects of conscious experience that have little or no con-
nection to skeletal muscle plans. This criticism is rightly stated,
indeed. However, in response to this criticism, it is important
to distinguish the primary role of evolutionary adaptations from
their secondary roles and current uses (Lorenz,1963; Gould,1977).
A scientist could argue, for example, that color perception evolved
for selecting fruits and detecting camouflaged prey and no sophis-
ticated observer would counter that color perception could also be
used to appreciate a painting. In fact, most people easily appreciate
the idea that the color harmony of a painting is beautiful to us – at
least in part – because it involves the kinds of stimuli that are of
adaptive significance in another context. Similarly, SIT proposes
that the original and primary function of conscious states was (and
is) to integrate conflicting action plans involving skeletal muscle,
not that all future and possible benefits of consciousness will be
encapsulated in this single benefit.
Supramodular interaction theory proposes that conscious
states involve broadcasts of the “outputs” of response systems
that may conflict with the tendencies of other systems and that
the outputs from response systems incessantly modulate one’s
consciousness, regardless of whether there is inter-system con-
flict or not. Hence, there is chronic engagement among the systems
(Morsella, 2005), assuring that no resources, time, or “intelligent
homunculus” are required to decide which outputs should partic-
ipate in the conscious field at a given time. That rich intelligence
is embedded in the inherent structure of the apparatus, as in the
case of many evolutionary products (Simpson, 1949).
It is easy to imagine a more efficient arrangement, such one that
invokes conscious states only under conditions of conflict. How-
ever, chronic engagement solves the problem at a more parsimo-
nious level. Consider that traffic lights, pool filters, and ball-return
machines at bowling alleys operate and expend energy continu-
ously, regardless of whether their function is presently needed.
These systems were chosen because the cost (in this case techno-
logically, and hence monetarily) of adding an additional detection
mechanism that activates the apparatus when it is needed is greater
than the benefit of what would likely be a very complex and
intricate system. In this way, chronic engagement is “efficiently
inefficient” in the sense that it does not require additional mecha-
nisms to determine whether channels of crosstalk should be open
or closed (Morsella, 2005). Such deceptively “inefficient” solutions
can be observed in biological functions outside the nervous system,
as in most biological filters (e.g., the kidneys) which continuously
filter a substrate regardless of the status of the substrate.
Chronic engagement also gives rise to the oft-mentioned mon-
itoring role of the conscious field (e.g., Angell, 1907; Norman and
Shallice, 1980). However, it is misleading to characterize the field
as merely supervising the outputs of response systems because the
function of the field is not to observe outputs, but to allow contin-
uous interactions among them. To build on the analogy of a senate,
the senators (systems) must always be in attendance, regardless of
whether they should sit quietly or debate (Morsella, 2005). Because
the outputs of all the systems are always phenomenally represented
(whether they are helpful or not), one experiences the subjective
experience of pain even when feeling the pain is at the moment not
conducive to adaptive action. And there is no way for an actor to
“tell himself” that, because he needs to lose 30 pounds for a movie
role, he will not experience hunger, even though the ultimately
adaptive behavior for him in the modern context is to secure a role
in the film.
A seeming mystery that engenders a third criticism is as follows,
if conscious states are primarily for skeletomotor action, then why
do conscious states continue to exist even when the skeletal muscle
system is deactivated because of, for example, damage to the ner-
vous system or a congenital disorder? In response to this criticism,
one should consider the following analogy. Consider that many of
today’s automobiles contain navigational systems whose primary
function is to help navigate the car to one’s desired destination.
With this in mind, it is conceivable that the navigational system
would continue to function despite problems with, say, the trans-
mission of the car. In a similar way, central conscious processes,
whose primary function was serving skeletomotor action, can con-
tinue to function even after the peripheral structures that they
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are intended to serve are non-operational. It is often the case
in situations where the body has been rendered ineffective, though
effectors or efference generators are compromised, that the cen-
tral processes that subserve the efferent processes remain intact
(similar decoupling of central conscious processing from periph-
eral events occurs in phantom limb; Ramachandran, 1999). In
short, consciousness is a system meant to integrate actions of sys-
tems that influence skeletal muscle, but it is not dependent on the
current capacity for skeletomotor action.
We now take a moment to address alternative explanations
about the phenomena we sought to explain in the selective review.
First, one may argue that, in attempting to describe the function
of consciousness in the nervous system, instead of proposing a
framework such as SIT, it is more parsimonious to simply hypoth-
esize that the primary role of consciousness is to suppress actions,
for holding one’s breath, carrying a hot plate of food, or per-
forming response interference tasks (e.g., the Stroop task) involves
response suppression. However, this fails to account for the role
of conscious states in integrated actions such as breathing faster
for some reward, which requires inter-system crosstalk but no
suppression.
Second, because novel skeletomotor actions tend to be executed
consciously, one may argue that the function of consciousness is,
not one of establishment of crosstalk for the purpose of inte-
gration, but instantiating stimulus-response relationships that are
“arbitrary.” One problem with this intriguing hypothesis is that
(a) it is difficult to define what constitutes an “arbitrary” mapping,
(b) there are countless cases of unconscious processes that seem to
involve arbitrary mappings, as in the case of motor programming
(Grossberg, 1999; Rosenbaum, 2002), and (c) some non-arbitrary
mappings (e.g., holding one’s breath leads to a negative subjective
state) never become unconscious, despite extensive training and
an inordinate amount of rehearsing the stimulus-response map-
pings. Moreover, unlike SIT, this hypothesis fails to explain why
smooth muscle actions and intersensory conflicts are mediated
unconsciously.
CONCLUSION
Supramodular Interaction Theory is a framework marrying the
central advancements in knowledge from the integration consen-
sus (chiefly that consciousness is for some type of information
integration) with an explanation of why “voluntary” action is
described as such. This marriage leads to an explanation of the
primary function (but not the only possible function) of con-
sciousness and gets past the tautology of calling voluntary action
“voluntary” because it is able to be willed. According to SIT, the
integration achieved through conscious states is primarily related
to the skeletal muscle output system, where anticipatory processes
play a central role as in the case of ideomotor control. SIT is
unique in that, while marrying consciousness to the physiological
processes it subserves, it explains subjective data from (a) inter-
sensory conflicts, (b) smooth muscle conflicts, and (c) conflict
from skeletomotor conflicts (e.g., holding one’s breath). An obvi-
ous limitation of the current approach is that it sheds no light
on why “subjectivity” is associated with the integrative functions
these states appear to subserve. Thus, more than 40 years later,
Shallice’s (1972) conclusion that consciousness is an unsolved
anomaly within the scientific approach still rings true. Neverthe-
less, the findings presented above reveal some conceptual progress
regarding the nature of consciousness in the brain. Today, one can
perhaps propose that, if the heart can be conceptualized as a pump
and the kidney as a filter, then consciousness can be conceptual-
ized as a form of information broadcasting (or, more precisely,
information integration). The new findings showing that subjec-
tive awareness requires reentrant (or echoic) processing present
a promising direction in understanding the nature the broad-
cast/binding that consciousness seems to instantiate. The physical
basis of the broadcasting associated with consciousness is most
likely unlike anything else we currently understand.
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